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Territorial Restrictions and Per Se Rules-A Re-
evaluation of the Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines 
1. lNTRODUCilON 
Under the law of antitrust, a territorial restriction is an artificial 
limitation upon the geographic area in which an economic unit 
may perform its business activities.1 There are essentially two types 
of territorial restrictions. When the restriction is created by agree-
ment between two or more economic entities performing similar 
economic functions, it is said to be "horizontal."2 Two manufac-
turers might, for example, agree to divide their geographical market-
ing area into separate and distinct territories. In this instance, since 
l. See generally A. NEALE, THE ANrrrRUST LAws OF THE U.S.A. 76-79 (2d ed, 1970); 
Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman A.ct, 75 HARV. L REV. 
795, 796 (1962). 
2. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 888 U.S. 850 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing 
Co. v. United States, Ml U.S. 593 (1951). 
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the parties to the agreement are both manufacturers, their scheme 
would be horizontal.3 On the other hand, if the restriction is im-
posed upon one economic unit by another unit engaged in a different 
but related economic function, the restriction is classified as "verti-
cal."4 That is, an agreement between a manufacturer and its distribu-
tors or the distributor and its customers would be vertical because 
both parties to the agreement are performing essentially different 
activities.5 In cases involving vertical and horizontal restrictions, it 
is arguable that the presence of the restriction reduces competition 
in some important respects.6 Nevertheless, the law views the presence 
of each type of territorial restriction differently. 
Horizontal territorial restrictions have traditionally been said 
to be per se illegal.7 That is, they are illegal no matter what effect 
they may have on competition.8 The legality of vertical territorial 
restrictions, however, is still an unsettled issue. The past decade saw 
a trend9 toward considering such restrictions per se violations of 
section I of the Sherman Act.10 That trend culminated in United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,11 a case better known for its specula-
tion than its reasoning. The Supreme Court, which ostensibly an-
nounced the per se illegality of these restrictions in Schwinn, will 
have an opportunity this term to refine or perhaps revise its views 
on this matter. The impetus for this review is supplied by United 
States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,12 a case in which the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois refused to accept 
a per se rule when considering the legality of territorial restric-
tions.13 It is the thesis of this Note that the Court should reverse its 
decision in Schwinn, and at the same time reconsider its blanket 
prohibition of horizontal territorial restrictions. As Topco illustrates, 
the judicial declaration that horizontal territorial restrictions are 
"naked restraints on trade"14 may only mislead the courts in their 
effort to apply the antitrust laws to particular cases. 
3. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 353-54 (1967). 
4. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &: Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967). 
5. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &: Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); White 
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847' 
(6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). 
6, See text accompanying notes 144-45 infra. 
7. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 358 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
See also Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951). 
8. See C. KAYSEN &: D. TURNER, .ANTITRUST POLICY 142 (1959); A. NEALE, supra 
note 1, at 27-29. 
9. Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), with United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn &: Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). 
11. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
12. 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 402 U.S. 905 (1971). 
13. 319 F. Supp. at 1042-43. 
14. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).-
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The judicial aversion to horizontal territorial restrictions is a 
long standing one. In the early case of Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. 
United States,15 the Court held that an agreement among competitors 
to divide up their sales area was unlawful since it unreasonably re-
strained trade. Likewise, in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United 
States,16 the Court found that an agreement by ball-bearing manu-
facturers to divide up the market was a violation of the Act. Since 
Timken, horizonal territorial restrictions have automatically been 
viewed as pernicious in their effect on competition and as "naked 
restraints on trade" so that it is generally conceded that all such 
restrictions are per se unlawful.17 On the other hand, though the 
law seems to be clear concerning horizontal territorial restrictions, 
the status of their vertical counterparts remains in question. 
While vertical territorial restrictions are not a new phenomenon 
in the business world, the legality of such arrangements was only 
recently considered by the Supreme Court. In White Motor Co. v. 
United States,18 the first case dealing with them, the Court took a 
very cautious attitude. The United States claimed in that case that 
defendant's resale price maintenance19 and territorial and customer 
restrictions were illegal per se under section I of the Sherman Act. 
The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio agreed with 
the Government and granted summary judgment against White 
Motor Co.20 The Supreme Court approved the lower court's sum-
mary disposition of the resale price maintenance issue, but reversed 
the summary judgment with respect to the territorial and customer 
restrictions. 21 
In concluding that a trial on the merits was necessary, the Court 
rejected the Government's contention that vertical and horizontal 
restrictions are so similar that the per se proscription against hori-
zontal restrictions should automatically be applied to vertical terri-
torial restrictions.22 The Court reasoned: 
15. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
16. 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
17. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1967) (Harlan, J,, dissent• 
ing); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). 
18. 372 U.S. 253 (1963), noted in Recent Development, 51 CALIF. L. REv, 608 
(1963); Note, The Effect of White Motor Co. on Exclusive Selling Arrangements, 17 
VAND. L. REv. 549 (1964). 
19. Resale price maintenance refers to an attempt by a manufacturer to set the 
price at which independent retailers may resell his product. See P. AREEDA, Amx-
TRusr ANALYSIS tjf 502 (1967). 
20. United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562, 585-88 (N.D. Ohio 1961). 
21. 372 U.S. at 264. 
22. 372 U.S. at 263. 
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Horizontal territorial limitations ... are-naked restraints· of trade 
with no purpose except stifling of competition. A vertical territorial 
limitation may or may not have that purpose or effect. We do not 
know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these 
arrangements emerge to be certain. They may be too dangerous to 
sanction or they may be allowable protections against aggressive 
competitors or the only practicable means a small company has for 
breaking into or staying in business . . . and within the "rule of 
reason." We need to know more than we do about the actual impact 
of these arrangements on competition to decide whether they have 
such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack ... any redeeming 
virtue" ... and therefore should be classified as per se violations of. 
the Sherman Act.23 
Accordingly, the Court would "intimate no view one way or the other 
on the legality of such an arrangement, for [it] believe[d] that 
the applicable rule of law should be designed after a trial."24 White 
J.vf.otor could be classified as a neutral opinion since it merely post-
poned the determination of the per se illegality of vertical restric-
tions. 
The neutrality of the opinion, however, is belied by the con-
curring25 and dissenting26 opinions. These opinions demonstrate 
the diverse attitudes of the Justices toward the underlying issue. The 
three dissenting Justices agreed with the lower court's granting of 
summary judgment on the territorial and customer restrictions issue. 
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Clark was critical of the Court's 
refusal to adopt the horizontal analogy advocated by the Justice De-
partment. He argued that the unanimity of action by three hundred 
dealers in signing contracts with similar restrictive provisions could 
be readily interpreted as a tacit conspiracy,27 and that these terri-
torial restrictions were essentially horizontal and should be treated 
as such.28 Furthermore, even if there were some distinction between 
horizontal and vertical territorial restrictions, Justice Clark main-
tained the restraints were beneficial only for White Motor Co., not 
the consumer.29 For the dissenters, the fact that there were no bene-
fits for the consumer was sufficient to warrant the conclusion that all 
territorial restrictions should be per se unlawful. This conclusion 
23. 372 U.S. at 263, quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 
(1957). 
24. 372 U.S. at 261. 
25. 372 U.S. at 264 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
26. 372 U.S. at 275 (Warren, C.J., Black &: Clark, JJ., dissenting). 
27. 372 U.S. at 280. 
28. 372 U.S. at 280-81. Compare United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253, 
275 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting), with United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 353-54 
(1967). 
29. 372 U.S. at 278. See generally Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Re-
strictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L REv. 1419, 1427-32 (1968). 
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was' believed essential to protect the "free competitive enterprise" 
system.80 
Justice Brennan was also concerned with the effect of the Court's 
opinion on the "free competitive enterprise" system, but for dif-
ferent reasons. He commented in more detail than the Court on 
the possible circumstances in which territorial restrictions would 
be acceptable, and noted that 
there are other situations ... in which the possibility of justifica-
tion cautions against a too hasty conclusion that territorial limitations 
are invariably unlawful. Arguments have been suggested against that 
conclusion, for example, in the case of a new manufacturer starting 
out in business or marketing a new and risky product; the suggestion 
is that such a manufacturer may find it essential simply in order 
to acquire and retain outlets, to guarantee his distributors some 
degree of territorial insulation as well as exclusive franchises. It has 
also been suggested that it may reasonably appear necessary for a 
manufacturer to subdivide his sales territory in order to insure that 
his product will be adequately advertised, promoted, and serviced.81 
Having expressed his grave reservations concerning a per se prohibi-
tion of vertical territorial restrictions, Justice Brennan nevertheless 
agreed with the Court's decision to wait until a more thorough 
record was available before adopting or rejecting a per se rule.82 
Shortly after White Motor, two decisions in the courts of appeals33 
espoused Justice Brennan's views regarding the applicability of a 
per se rule to vertical territorial restrictions. The first of these, Snap-
On Tools Corp. v. FTC,84 involved a territorial restriction imposed 
by a manufacturer operating in the highly competitive hand-tool 
industry. Snap-On argued that its territorial restrictions were justifi-
able because the number and complexity of its products required 
personal demonstrations, which in tum necessitated close relation-
ships between customers and Snap-On's dealers.BG It was Snap-On's 
contention that without territorial restrictions it would be unable 
to attract dealers because of the extensive sales effort necessary to 
distribute the product.Bo Arguing that the validity of vertical terri-
torial restrictions must be tested under the rule of reason, Snap-On 
maintained the restrictions were legitimate trade restraints.87 After 
30. 372 U.S. at 278. 
31. 372 U.S. at 269. 
32. 372 U.S. at 264. 
33. Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Fl'C, 
321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). 
34. 321 F .2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). 
35. 321 F.2d at 828·29. 
36. For further discussion of the "free ride" problem, see Bork, The Rule of Rea• 
son and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 
430-38 (1966); Comanor, supra note 29, at 1432-33. 
37. 321 F.2d at 827-28. 
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extensive hearings, the Federal Trade Commission had ordered 
Snap-On to abandon the restrictions on its dealers.38 On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit, interpreting White Motor as an explicit rejection of 
a per se rule against vertical arrangements, concluded that the mini-
mal restraint on intrabrand competition was produced only to in-
crease over-all interbrand competition.39 It further noted that the 
possibilities of abuse through Snap-On's restrictions were limited 
because of the highly competitive nature of the hand tools industry.40 
The Sixth Circuit, in Sandura Co. v. FTC,41 also found a vertical 
territorial restriction to be neither a per se violation nor a violation 
of the rule of reason. Sandura had been accused by the FTC of 
fixing resale prices and imposing illegal territorial restrictions on 
its distributors.42 It had been a small but successful competitor in 
the floor tile industry, but subsequent mechanical production prob-
lems led to consumer dissatisfaction with its product and to decreas-
ing sales.43 The poor reputation of the product made distributors 
reluctant to stock it even after the defects had been corrected.44 
To regain its market share and to avoid bankruptcy, Sandura 
offered distributors exclusive territories in which to promote the 
improved floor tiles.46 This incentive was all the more necessary 
since distributors would have to bear the promotional and adver-
tising expenses that Sandura itself was unable to finance.46 The FTC 
agreed that the territorial restrictions might have initially been 
necessary to attract distributors, but contended that the restrictions 
had ceased to be necessary since Sandura products were no longer 
considered inferior.47 In addition, the FTC maintained that the 
substantial freight charges incurred in shipping floor tiles were suf-
ficient to prevent interterritorial, and thus intrabrand, competition 
among distributors.48 Accordingly, the FTC held the vertical terri-
torial restrictions to be more restrictive than necessary.49 
38. Snap-On Tools Corp., 59 F.T.C. 1035, 1059 (1961). 
39. 321 F.2d at 831-32. 
40. 321 F.2d at 833. The court also considered allegations that Snap-On had en-
gaged in resale price maintenance. It found none practiced in one sales market in 
which Snap-On and its dealers competed. In another market where the court found 
that resale price maintenance had in fact been instituted, Snap-On and its dealers were 
not competitors; the scheme was thus countenanced under state fair trade acts and the 
McGuire Amendment to § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) 
(1970). 321 F.2d at 834. 
41. 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964), noted in Recent Development, 65 COLUM, L •. REv. 
1115 (1965); Recent Case, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1679 (1965). 
42. Sandura Co., 61 F.T.C. 756, 758 (1962). 
43. 339 F .2d at 850. 
44. 339 F.2d at 851. 
45. 339 F.2d at 851. 
46. 339 F.2d at 851. 
47. 339 F.2d at 855. 
48. 339 F.2d at 855. 
49. 339 F.2d at 855. 
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In reviewing the FTC's cease-and-desist order, the court rejected 
the possibility that vertical restrictions were per se unlawful and 
tested the restrictions under the rule of reason. 60 The court con-
cluded that the vertical territorial restrictions were both reasonable 
and necessary since they had kept Sandura from going bankrupt yet 
had given Sandura no more than a foothold in the floor tile mar~et.61 
As was the case in Snap-On, Sandura's vertical territorial restrictions 
were held to be permissible restraints on trade when tested under 
the rule of reason. 
The Justice Department, in spite of the adverse decisions in 
White Motor, Snap-On, and Sandura, continued to advocate the per 
se prohibition of territorial restrictions. It eventually presented the 
Supreme Court with two cases to test the proposition.62 The Court 
resolved the issue with more conviction than clarity. The hold-
ing, rationale, and treatment of precedent in each case are subject 
to question. 
In the first of these cases, United States v. Sealy, Inc.,63 the Court 
side-stepped the question of the per se illegality of vertical territorial 
restrictions and rested its decisions on other grounds. A group of 
mattress manufacturers had established Sealy, Inc., to oversee the 
licensing of the Sealy trademark. In implementing its supervisory 
role, Sealy, Inc., had imposed territorial restrictions on manufacturers 
using the Sealy trademark and had set minimum prices at which 
Sealy products could be advertised and sold. 64 
The trial court concluded that Sealy, Inc., and its licensees had 
unlawfully conspired to fix prices,65 but found the territorial re-
strictions imposed were "secondary, or ancillary, to the main purpose 
of Sealy's license contracts," and hence refused to find a conspiracy 
to allocate territories. 56 In arguments before the Court, both the 
United States and Sealy assumed that the territorial restrictions were 
vertical, 57 and thus centered their arguments on the merits of a per 
se prohibition of such restrictions. The Court, speaking through 
50. 339 F.2d at 853-54. 
51. 339 F.2d at 858. 
52. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn 8: Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States v. 
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). A third case, Serta Associates, Inc. v. United States, 
393 U.S. 534 (1969), involving essentially the same facts as Sealy, was affirmed per 
curiam. 
53. 388 U.S. 350 (1967), affirming 1964 TRADE CAs., 1J 71,258 (N.D. Ill. 1964), 
54. 388 U.S. at 351. 
55. 1964 TRADE CAs. at 80,107. 
56. 1964 TRADE CAS. at 80,077. 
57. See 388 U.S. at 358 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It was Justice Harlan's contention 
that the failure of the Government to allege "that Sealy, Inc. was no more than a 
facade for conspiracy to suppress competition," (quoting from Brief for the Petitione1· 
at 12) suggested that the case was taken "out of the category of horizontal agree• 
ments, and thus out of the per se category as well." 388 U.S. at 361. 
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Justice Fortas, rejected this assumption and held that the Sealy ar-
rangement was in fact a horizontal conspiracy.58 As the Court des-
cribed the situation: 
The arrangements for exclusive territories are necessarily chargeable 
to the licensees of appellee whose interests such arrangements were 
supposed to promote .... It would violate reality to treat them as 
equivalent to territorial limitations imposed by a manufacturer upon 
independent dealers as incident to the sale of a trademarked product. 
Sealy, Inc., is an instrumentality of the licensees for purpose of the 
horizontal territorial allocation. It is not the principal.59 
Accordingly, the Court felt compelled to apply the test for horizontal, 
as opposed to vertical, territorial restrictions in this situation. 60 
The Court, however, was not precise in expressing the rationale 
for condemning the restrictions. On the one hand, it is arguable that 
the Court held the horizontal restrictions void because they were per 
se illegal, as suggested in White Motor.61 The Court emphatically 
noted that the restriction was horizontal, asserting that the price-
fixing, which was effected by the manufacturers' representatives on 
the Sealy board of directors, "underlines the horizontal nature of 
the enterprise."62 Thus, the Court might have meant that the presence 
of horizontal restrictions alone was sufficient to invoke the per se 
prohibition. This is certainly the view taken by Justice Harlan in 
his dissent since he felt that "[h]orizontal agreements among manufac-
turers to divide territories have long been held to violate the anti-
trust laws without regard to any asserted justification for them .... 
[S]uch restraints are immediately suspect."63 Justice Harlan found 
nothing in the majority opinion to dispute his conclusion. It could 
be concluded then that the Court believed horizontal territorial 
restrictions among competitors to be sufficient by themselves .to in-
voke the per se rule, and that price-fixing was only an additional 
reason why the Sealy restrictions should not have been condoned. 
On the other hand, the assertion here that price-fixing "under-
lines the horizontal nature of the enterprise" might mean that the 
territorial restriction by itself did not warrant a per se prohibition. 
It is true that Addyston has traditionally been read to hold horizon-
tal market divisions among competitors per se illegal.64 Addyston, 
58. 388 U.S. at 356. The trial court had found that only r1110 Sealy licensees would 
have competed in a single geographical market but for the restriction imposed by the 
licensor. 1964 TRADE CAS. at 80,080-81. 
59. 388 U.S. at 353-54. 
60. 388 U.S. at 355. 
61. White Motor Co. v. United Stat~, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (dictum). See also 
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
62. 388 U.S. at 356. 
63. 388 U.S. at 358-59. 
64. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). 
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however, was the prototype of a "naked restraint of trade." The re-
strictions were designed solely to restrain competition;611 there was 
no suggestion of an efficiency that the parties sought to promote. 
When faced with a horizontal restriction that has an arguable ef-
ficiency-promoting effect the Court should be more reluctant to ap-
ply a per se proscription. Sealy may have been such a case. Because 
the Court acknowledged that the territorial restrictions may have 
served purposes other than that of insulating the parties from com-
petition among themselves, it looked beyond the restrictions them-
selves to condemn them; it founded its objection on the fact that the 
territorial restrictions were part of an unlawful price-fixing scheme.00 
This aggregation of trade restraints spoke louder than any of the 
proposed benefits from the territorial restrictions themselves. Under 
established theory, the presence of this aggregation was enough to 
condemn the components without an analysis of putative effects and 
justifications. 67 Whether the Court would have been willing to strike 
down the restrictions as per se illegal absent the price-fixing is far 
from clear. Indeed, there is a statement in the Sealy opinion, pre-
scient in many respects, that a market division by small grocers 
pursuant to a plan to use a common name and advertisements would 
present an entirely different case, not necessarily proscribed under 
the law of horizontal restrictions. 68 The more persuasive the eco-
nomic rationale for a horizontal restriction unencumbered by price-
fixing, the less likely the Court is to apply a rule of per se illegality. 
While Sealy and its predecessors thus appear to prohibit hori-
zontal and vertical territorial restrictions that are integrated with 
price-fixing, the Court left to the companion case, United States v. 
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,69 the question whether vertical territorial 
restrictions in themselves were per se unlawful. In Schwinn, the 
situation was essentially vertical, for the manufacturer was respon-
sible for the territorial restrictions imposed upon distinctly indepen-
dent dealers and distributors.70 Schwinn, formerly the nation's largest 
manufacturer of bicycles, had revised its marketing plan in 1952 in 
65. 175 U.S. at 240-41. 
66. The district court had enjoined the price-fixing portion of the Sealy program, 
This ruling was not appealed, but the Court stated that "the existence and impact 
of the practice cannot be ignored in our appraisal of the territorial limitations." 888 
U.S. at 355. 
67. 388 U.S. at 357-58. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 
593, 598 (1951). 
68. 388 U.S. at 357. 
69. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
70. 388 U.S. at 372. Although the Court suggested that the only criterion for clas• 
sifying a restriction as vertical was that the restriction be imposed by the manufac• 
turer and that the parties be distinctly independent, it has been suggested that an 
additional criterion should be that the restriction be imposed for the manufacturer's 
own benefit. See Bork, supra note 36, at _397. 
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the hope of recapturing its dominant position in the bicycle market. 
Under the revised plan, Schwinn offered its dealers the options of 
purchasing its product directly from the manufacturer or purchasing 
the product through an authorized distributor. In either case, the 
dealer received title to the goods.71 In its dealings with the distrib-
utors, Schwinn made outright sales or utilized a consignment or 
agency scheme.72 The distinction between the two schemes for dis-
tributing was that the distributor received title in the case of sales 
while "title, dominion, and risk"73 remained in the manufacturer in 
a consignment or agency transaction. Under any of its methods of 
distribution, however, Schwinn prohibited its dealers from selling 
to anyone other than consumers and prohibited its distributors from 
selling to anyone other than franchised dealers within their desig-
nated territories.74 It was these prohibitions that were at issue in the 
courts.75 
In deciding Schwinn, the district court found the two restrictions 
acceptable whenever Schwinn sent the bicycles to distributors on 
consignment, but concluded that the territorial restrictions in sales 
situations were per se violations of the Sherman Act.76 The Supreme 
Court substantially agreed with the district court's conclusions and 
placed particular emphasis on the lower court's distinction between 
consignment and sales.77 According to the Court, which again spoke 
through Justice Fortas, the restrictions were justified when the manu-
facturer retained the title to the goods since then the distributor was 
an agent of Schwinn.78 In these circumstances, Schwinn, not its 
distributors, would be subject to the risk of loss on the product.79 On 
the other hand, when the "title, dominion, and risk" was transferred 
to the distributors, the agency argument failed. To control the dis-
tribution process once the items were sold to another party was to 
71. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 327 (N.D. Ill. 1965). 
72. There was a distinction between Schwinn's consignment and agency plans. 
Under the consignment plan, Schwinn shipped the bicycles to its distributors, who 
placed the products in their own warehouses. Under the agency plan, however, 
Schwinn rented space in the distributor's warehouse and set the resale price at which 
the bicycles would be sold to the retailers. In both cases, however, title remained with 
Schwinn until the dealers had paid for the bicycles. See 237 F. Supp. at 328. 
73. 388 U.S. at 380. 
74. 388 U.S. at 371. 
75. The Government also alleged price-fixing, but the trial court found no evidence 
of it. 237 F. Supp. at 343. The Government failed to raise this issue on appeal. 388 
U.S. at ll68. 
76. 2ll7 F. Supp. at ll43. At trial the Government had argued that all of the Schwinn 
distribution restrictions were per se illegal. When it appealed to the Supreme Court, 
the Government relented and simply argued that the restrictions were invalid under 
the rule of reason. 388 U.S. at 368. 
77. 388 U.S. at 379-81. 
78. See 388 U.S. at 381. 
79. 888 U.S. at 380. 
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work a restraint on alienation, a result the Court would not counte-
nance. Accordingly, the Court approved the restrictions with respect 
to the "Schwinn plan,"80 but not with respect to sales.st 
While the Court condemned the territorial and customer restric-
tions on the facts of Schwinn, 82 the extent of the prohibition on 
vertical territorial restrictions remains an unresolved issue. The 
majority of commentators83 suggest that Schwinn should be inter-
preted as an unqualified adoption of the per se rule against vertical 
territorial restrictions in sales cases.84 A number of courts have inter-
preted Schwinn in this manner.815 There is more than adequate evi-
dence in the Schwinn opinion to support this reading. For example, 
in Schwinn, the Court maintained: "Once the manufacturer has 
parted with title and risk, he has parted with dominion over the 
product, and his effort thereafter to restrict territory or persons to 
whom the product may be transferred-whether by explicit agree-
ment or by silent combination or understanding with his vendee-
is a per se violation of§ 1 of the Sherman Act."86 It is these words 
that are primarily used to support the hypothesis that Schwinn stands 
for a per se prohibition of vertical territorial restrictions when sales 
have been made. 
In contrast, it has also been suggested that the Schwinn decision 
80. The "Schwinn plan" refers to sales made to dealers with the distributors acting 
as agents only. 237 F. Supp. at 327. 
81. 388 U.S. at 379. 
82. 388 U.S. at 378. 
83. Schwinn is perhaps most famous for the large amount of legal literature which 
it generated. See, e.g., B. BoCK, ANTITRUST ISSUES IN R.EsrrucrING SALES TERRITORIES AND 
OUTLErs (1967); Averill, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman One: An Analysis and Prognosis, 
15 N.Y.L.F. 39 (1969); Bridges, New Concepts in Customer and Territorial Restric• 
tions-The Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1156; Keck, The Schwinn 
Case, 23 Bus. I.Aw. 669 (1968); Kittelle, Territorial and Customer Restrictions 
Through Consignment or Agency-Schwinn or Sin1, 12 ANTITRusr BULL. 1007 (1967); 
Sadd, Territorial and Customer Restrictions After Sealy and Schwinn, 38 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 249 (1969); Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After Sealy and Schwinn, 12 
ANTITRusr BuLL. 1181 (1967); Note, Anti-Trust: Vertical Restrictions, 20 BAYLOR L. 
REv. 237 (1968); Comment, Effects of Schwinn Bike on Territorial and Customer Re• 
straints and Consignments: Will It Force Manufacturers into Forward lntergration1, 2 
CONN. L. REv. 383 (1969); Recent Decision, 6 DUQUESNE L. REv. 162 (1967); Recent 
Decision, 36 Gro. WASH, L. REv. 235 (1967); Recent Decision, 43 IND, L.J. 486 (1968); 
Note, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn if Co.-Vertical Customer and Territorial Re-
strictions and the Sherman Act, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 262 (1968); Comment, The Impact 
of the Schwinn Case on Territorial Restrictions, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 497 (1968); Recent 
Case, 21 VAND. L. REv. 142 (1968); Case Comment, 25 WASH. &: LEE L. REv. 121 
(1968); Comment, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn if Co.-A Constructive Interpreta-
tion or "Do What I Mean, Not What I Say", 14 WAYNE L. REV. 593 (1968). 
84. See, e.g., B. BocK, supra note 83, at 26; Kittelle, supra note 83, at 1022. 
85. See Interphoto Corp. v. Minalta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 417 
F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1, 8·11 (D.D.C. 
1969); Fagen v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 303 F. Supp. 356, 360-61 (S.D. Ill. 1969). 
86. 388 U.S. at 382. 
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might be limited to its facts.87 The basis of this argument is the fol-
lowing statement, made by the Court immediately prior to its decla-
ration of the restraints-on-alienation test: "Under the Sherman Act, 
it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to re-
strict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be 
traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it."88 
This statement is susceptible to at least two interpretations. On the 
one hand, it suggests that a manufacturer's restricting and confining 
areas and persons with whom distributors may trade is alone a per 
se violation of the Act when that manufacturer has departed with 
dominion. On the other hand, the statement may mean that the 
restrictions on sales are per se unlawful unless there is some recog-
nized defense to the restriction. No such defense was present in 
Schwinn, but arguably such defenses do exist. For instance, earlier 
in its opinion the Court mentioned that the facts in Schwinn "do 
not come within the specific illustrations which the Court in White 
Motor articulated as possible factors relevant to a showing that the 
challenged vertical restraint is sheltered by the rule of reason be-
cause it is not anticompetitive."89 The Court then enumerated two 
possible defenses to the per se prohibition of vertical restrictions. 
The first was a "newcomer" defense.90 If a firm was starting or only 
recently developed, it might initially avail itself of vertical territorial 
restrictions to establish channels of distribution.91 The second was a 
"failing company" defense.92 If a formerly successful firm suffered 
substantial setbacks in the market, as was the case in Sandura, the 
company might utilize a vertical territorial restriction to regain its 
lost channels of distribution.93 Thus, if the facts of a particular case 
placed the defendant in one of these categories delineated in Sch-
winn, the per se rule would be disregarded, and instead, the reason-
ableness of the restriction would be tested. Consequently, there could 
be substantial confusion among the lower courts concerning the ex-
tent of the per se illegality of a vertical territorial restriction. This 
certainly appeared to be the case in Topco. 
87. See Lundburg, Schwinn and Beyond: The Survival of the Rule of Reason in 
Vertically Imposed Customer and Territorial Restrictions, 30 MoNT. L. REv. 141, 147 
(1968); Williams, Distribution and the Sherman Act-The Effects of General Motors, 
Schwinn and Sealy, 1967 DuKE L.J. 732, 740; Note, Restrictive Distribution Arrange-
ments After the Schwinn Case, 53 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 514, 521-23 (1968); Recent Devel• 
opment, 13 VILL. L. REv. 192, 198 (1967). See also Comanor, supra note 29, at 1437-38. 
88. 388 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added). 
89. 388 U.S. at 374. 
90. 388 U.S. at 374. 
91. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 269 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
92. 388 U.S. at 374. 
93. See text accompanying notes 41-51 supra. 
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III. ToPco: THE UsE OF TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS 
To FURTHER COMPETITION 
The territorial restrictions in Topco had been adopted in 1944 
by an association of small- and medium-sized grocery chains attempt-
ing to compete effectively with existing large grocery chains.04 The 
inevitable trend toward mass merchandising was already appearing.011 
One reason for the growth in mass merchandising was the ability of 
chains to generate large sales volumes. This permitted chains to 
establish highly efficient purchasing organizations that utilized their 
broad national base to extract the best products and prices from 
food suppliers.06 Growth was also attributed to the efficient and suc-
cessful marketing practices that could only be developed by chains 
that secured preferred locations for their stores, saturated lucrative 
marketing areas with outlets, established local warehouses, and took 
full advantage of local advertising.07 Therefore, at the time Topco 
was established, it was already evident that the smaller chains and 
independent stores would have to develop practices similar to those 
of their larger competitors or be incapable of effectively competing. 
An additional practice resulting in a competitive advantage to 
the large chains was the creation of private-label goods. Large chains 
had discovered that they could develop their own line of quality 
products that could effectively compete with brands already estab-
lished rather than depend upon the national food suppliers for their 
goods.08 For the food industry as a whole, the creation of private 
labels had procompetitive effects, for the demand for private labels 
represented additional outlets in which the smaller food-processors 
could market their goods.09 At the same time, private labels meant 
that the consumer could purchase a wider line of products, some-
times at lower prices.100 Potentially, the greatest advantage of private 
labels, however, would accrue to the large chain stores, since their 
private label, carried only by their outlets, induced customers to shop 
in their stores. Thus, the good will established by their private label 
extended only to that particular chain.101 
Although benefits from the use of private labels accrued to the 
smaller manufacturers, consumers and large chains, the remaining 
94. 319 F. Supp. at 1032-33. 
95. 319 F. Supp. at 1034. See generally B. HOLDREN, THE STRUcrtJRE OF A RETAIL 
MARKET AND THE MARKET BEHAVIOR OF RETAIL UNITS 10-17 (1960). 
96. 319 F. Supp. at 1034. See w. MUELLER &: L. GARAJAN, CHANGES IN THE MARKET 
STRUCfURE OF GROCERY RETAILING 113-14 (1961). 
97. 319 F. Supp. at 1034. 
98. 319 F. Supp. at 1035. 
99. 319 F. Supp. at 1035. 
100. 319 F. Supp. at 1035. 
101. 319 F. Supp. at 1035. 
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participants in the retail grocery industry were placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage. Without private labels of their own, small 
stores and chains faced the loss of customers and sales to the larger 
chains; yet, the successful development of their own private labels 
would require the guarantee of a sales volume in excess of $250 
million.102 This large sales volume was necessitated by the great ex-
penditures on advertising and other promotion essential to winning 
new customers and keeping old customers away from the larger 
competitors.103 This, however, was a sales volume that most small-
and medium-sized chains were unable to achieve.104 To reach the 
economies necessary to market their own private labels and to over-
come the larger chain stores' competitive advantages, the smaller 
stores organized food cooperatives.105 
Topco provides an excellent example of this phenomenon. In 
the Topco Associates cooperative, the twenty-five members had indi-
vidual sales ranging from $1.6 million to $182.8 million in 1967, 
but their combined sales for that year exceeded $2.3 billion.106 The 
combined sales of Topco Associates thus rivaled those of the largest 
chains in the nation, though Topco's brands accounted for, on the 
average, only ten per cent of each member's sales total.107 By pooling 
their ability to sell, these stores were able to achieve the efficiency 
necessary to distribute private labels while permitting each member 
to maintain independent pricing, management, and marketing poli-
cies.1os 
Even with the pooling of their ability to sell, the members of 
Topco Associates felt that the costs of producing a private brand 
were prohibitive to a small grocery chain operating on a low profit 
margin unless some assurance were given that local competition 
would not arise in Topco goods lest one member be able to take 
advantage of another member's costly promotional efforts.109 Restric-
tions on distribution were thought to be necessary to attract initial 
and subsequent members. One such restriction was the provision 
that members would be licensed to sell Topco products only in desig-
nated geographical territories. This restriction had been adopted 
in 1944 and was still in effect at the time the suit was brought.110 
102. 319 F. Supp. at 1035. 
103. 319 F. Supp. at 1036. 
104. 319 F. Supp. at 1036. 
105. For further discussion of the development and growth of food-purchasing 
cooperatives, see STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC INQUIRY 
INTO FOOD MARKETING I, 157-235 (f960). 
106. 319 F. Supp. at 1033. 
107. Only A & P, Safeway, and Kroger had greater retail sales. 319 F. Supp. at 1033. 
108. 319 F. Supp. at 1037. 
109. 319 F. Supp. at 1036. See :Bork, supra note 36, at 430-38. 
110. 319 F. Supp. at 1036, 
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While there were some rare instances in which two or more licensees 
were competing in the same territories, for the most part the 
licensing system eliminated any possibility of intrabrand competition 
between the members.111 
An additional restriction eliminated the possibility of intra-
brand competition resulting from the wholesaling of Topco Associ-
ates' products by members to nonmembers. In order to wholesale 
Topco products, it was necessary for a member first to obtain per-
mission from Topco Associates, which, in turn, consulted with mem-
bers that might be potentially affected by the wholesaling.112 Even 
in cases in which permission to wholesale was granted, Topco placed 
territorial limits on this activity, reducing a member's potential 
profits from wholesaling.113 These two restrictions prevented any 
possibility of intrabrand competition in Topco products. 
The fact that these restrictions prevented all intrabrand com-
petition provided the attraction to new members allegedly necessary 
for the success of Topco Associates' plan.114 However, it was this 
same effect on competition that led the Government to allege that 
the plan was per se illegal. It was the Government's contention that 
because the restrictions substantially eliminated all intrabrand com-
petition, they were a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.115 Topco Associates, on the other hand, not only argued against 
the application of the per se rule, but also contended that the re-
strictions were necessary to increase over-all competition in the re-
tail grocery industry, 116 and thus were valid under the rule of 
reason.117 
IV. ToPco's SHORTCOMINGS 
In light of Schwinn and Sealy, one would expect a trial court 
deciding a case like Topco to devote a considerable portion of its 
lll. 319 F. Supp. at 1036, 
112. 319 F. Supp. at 1037-38. 
113. 319 F. Supp. at 1038. It should be noted tbat all but five of Topco Associates' 
licensees agreed not to wholesale. 
114. 319 F. Supp. at 1036. 
115. 319 F. Supp. at 1040. 
116. 319 F. Supp. at 1041. The economic benefits and harms resulting from vertical 
territorial restrictions tbat eliminate intrabrand competition are highly disputed, 
Compare Bork, supra note 36, with Comanor, supra note 29. It is frequently argued 
tbat territorial restrictions are necessary to increase interbrand competition, and thus, 
tbe loss of intrabrand competition is outweighed by tbe general increase in inter• 
brand competition. See, e.g., Snap-On Tools v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963), 
However, when such an argument is made, it is often difficult to discern whether it 
is competition or the competitors that benefit. 
117. 319 F. Supp. at 1041. Under the rule of reason the Court takes note of, among 
other things, the procompetitive effects of the restriction and tries to balance them 
against the harms that result from the presence of the restriction. 
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thought toward distinguishing or reconciling these ambiguous deci-
sions with the case at hand. In Topco, however, the court devoted 
little time discussing the impact of these decisions.118 It succinctly 
disposed of Sealy and Schwinn by noting that "[i]n each instance it 
was clear that the effect of the agreements was to substantially elimi-
nate or reduce competition among manufacturers or dealers who 
might otherwise compete with each other."119 Because the court did 
not find a substantial reduction of competition in Topco, it con-
cluded that the rule of reason, not a per se rule, should apply.120 A 
closer examination of Sealy and Schwinn illustrates why the court 
was justified in its approach. 
A. Sealy: The Relevance of Distributor Conduct 
The Topco restrictions are never clearly classified as vertical or 
horizontal in the trial court opinion.121 It is arguable that since the 
facts in Top.co were similar to those of other cases in which courts 
found territorial restrictions to be vertical, Topco Associates should 
also be classified as vertical.122 The parent company in Topco, as 
in Schwinn and Sandura, was an independent legal entity engaged in 
a different economic function from the other parties to the territorial 
restrictions. Topco Associates performed distributive functions while 
its franchisees were engaged in the retailing of grocery products.123 
If this were the sole structural element to be considered, it would 
be vertical. Under this test, however, the Sealy arrangement would 
also be vertical since it too was a separate legal entity performing 
economic functions different from those of its franchisees.124 Some-
thing more than the performance of different economic functions 
and ostensibly separate economic entities is thus needed to make . 
a restriction vertical. 
Sealy suggested that there was an additional factor to be used in 
categorizing a particular case as vertical or horizontal. That addi-
tional factor was the independence of the entity imposing the re-
striction from those on whom the restriction was imposed.125 It was 
not adequate that the entity be ostensibly separate from the £ran-
118. See 319 F. Supp. at 1040-41. 
119. 319 F. Supp. at 1041. 
120. 319 F. Supp. at 1042-43. 
121. In this regard, Topco differs radically from Sealy, in which the Court took 
pains to distinguish horizontal and vertical restrictions for purposes of the Sherman 
Act. See 388 U.S. at 352. 
122. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Sandura Co. 
v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th 
Cir. 1963). 
123. 319 F. Supp. at 1032. 
124. See 388 U.S. at 353. 
125. 388 U.S. at 354. 
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cnisee. Rather, the entity must truly be independent in its decision-
making from its franchisees. 
This concern for independent decision-making no doubt explains 
the particular emphasis of the Supreme Court on the overlapping 
interests of Sealy, Inc., and its licensees. Of primary significance to 
the Court was the fact that Sealy, Inc., was under the complete con-
trol of the mattress manufacturers who were also Sealy licensees.120 
The licensees owned substantially all the outstanding stock of Sealy, 
Inc., whose board of directors was composed entirely of licensee-
stockholders.127 Since Sealy, Inc., and its licensees had identical inter-
ests, the Court viewed the restrictions not as vertically imposed, but 
rather, because they were "chargeable" to the licensees, as horizon-
tally imposed.128 Sealy may be interpreted as suggesting that not only 
the difference in economic function but also the existence of in-
dependent decision-making is relevant in deciding whether a vertical 
or horizontal rationale should be applied to territorial restrictions, 
since the Court will be "moved by the identity of the persons who 
act, rather than the label of their hats."129 
If the district court in T opco had been more concerned with the 
identity of persons acting instead of the labels of their hats, Sealy 
might not have been so readily dismissed. The licensees in Topco 
controlled all the outstanding stock.13° Further, the stockholder-
licensees extracted covenants from each other that prevented dis-
posal of T opco Associates stock to an outside party without first 
offering it to the remaining stockholders.131 This provision prevented 
control from ever falling outside the hands of the licensees. Since 
the directors in Topco were executives of the shareholder-licensees, 
there is even more reason to believe that the territorial restrictions 
were only nominally vertical. Even though Topco Associates did 
have its own staff and employees,132 the tightly knit arrangement be-
tween Topco and its licensees suggests that its decisions should be 
"chargeable" to the licensee-shareholders. Thus, it would appear that 
Topco, like Sealy, involves horizontal, not vertical, restrictions. 
B. The Horizontal Per Se Rule and the "Competitors" Test 
As suggested by the Court in White Motor, the rationale behind 
a per se rule is that horizontal territorial restrictions are naked re-
126. See 388 U.S. at 352-53. 
127. 388 U.S. at 352-53. 
128. 388 U.S. at 353-54. 
129. 388 U.S. at 353. 
130. 319 F. Supp. at 1033-34. 
131, 319 F. Supp. at 1034. 
132. 319 F. Supp. at 1032. 
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straints on trade that have no redeeming virtue.133 In Topco's cit• 
cumstances, the appropriateness of a per se approach is questionabie 
since the court found that there was, indeed, substantial justification 
for the territorial restrictions.134 As the trial court noted, access to 
private labels allowed small grocers the opportunity to offer con• 
sumers a greater variety of products at lower prices.135 The Topco 
arrangement had significant economic benefits in that it allowed 
smaller grocers an opportunity to compete more effectively with the 
giants of the food industry. In this respect, the facts of Topco were 
significantly different from the previous cases in which horizontal 
restraints had been found to exist. In Timken,136 Addyston,131 and 
Sealy,138 the Court found little economic justification for the par• 
ticular restrictions. The Court has not had occasion to strike down 
a horizontal scheme that is truly procompetitive in its effect. The 
horizontal restraints it has so far encountered have been naked re-
straints aimed solely at reducing competition or restrictions that 
have been infected by their association with price-fixing.139 
There is yet another manner in which Topco differs from the 
true horizontal restraint case. In Topco it is doubtful that the court 
was considering a case involving competitors. Topco members were 
located throughout thirty-three states but few members had stores 
in the same marketing areas.140 This fact would suggest that Topco's 
licensees, in general, were not actual competitors. The restrictions 
in the other horizontal cases, on the other hand, were among parties 
who were either in direct competition or would have been but for 
the restraint. In Sealy, for example, the trial court found that there 
were occasions when only the licensing restrictions ancillary to the 
use of the trademark prevented particular manufacturers from being 
actual competitors.141 Likewise, in Timken, the Court appeared to 
believe that the cartel agreements were used to prevent competition 
that was imminent.142 Again in Addyston, it appeared that the parties 
to the agreement were competitors. In Judge Taft's words, the agree-
133. See text accompanying note 23 supra. 
134. For a discussion of the rules applicable in horizontal restraint situations, see 
text accompanying notes 64-68 supra. 
135. 31!) F. Supp. at 1035. 
136. See 341 U.S. at 598-99. 
137. See 175 U.S. at 243. 
138. See 388 U.S. at 354. 
139. See 388 U.S. at 375-76. 
140. 319 F. Supp. at 1033, 1042. 
141. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 1964 TRADE CAs. ,r 71,258, at 80,081 (N.D. m. 
1964), afjd., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). 
142. See 341 U.S. at 595-96. 
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ment "was· tempered by the fear of competition."143 It would seem 
that· the so-called per se prohibition against horizontal territorial 
restrictions is actually just a per se prohibition against territorial re-
strictions among competitors. 
This distinction benv-een competitors and noncompetitors finds 
support not only in the case law, but in economic theory as well. 
The objection that .may be raised to territorial restrictions among 
competitors is that such restrictions tend to enhance prices.144 Agree-
ments to create territorial restrictions may in effect be agreements 
to create geographical monopolies. Even when there are substitutes 
for the products that the collaborators produce, the same conclusion 
is justified. Assuming there is no monopoly, it would appear that 
each party would have less market power to fix its initial price, even 
when aided by the agreement. Nevertheless, it also seems clear that 
the agreement to divide up the market will still give each party more 
market power than he previously possessed. With the aid of the 
agreement, each competitor is faced by what probably will be a sub-
stantially reduced number of competitors. This means that there 
will be less pressure on each manufacturer or retailer to reduce his 
prices to respond to competition.145 
It might be argued, in opposition to the application of the per se 
rule, that the agreement may be necessary to promote some goal other 
than that of restraining competition. For example, in Sealy and Tim-
ken, it was argued that the territorial restrictions were essential to the 
proper promotion of the particular trademark.146 While in both 
cases the Court was unmoved by the argument, there may be in-
stances when such agreements will have advantageous effects on 
competition.147 However, as several commentators have suggested, 
when restrictions as a class have an adverse effect on competition, 
it may be better to sacrifice the legality of some agreements that may 
produce limited benefits in order to obtain the advantages of a per se 
rule.148 This seems especially true for horizontal restrictions among 
competitors since harm to competition will certainly result and the 
potential advantages of the restriction are most often speculative. 
When the restriction exists between parties who are not at the 
143. United States v. Addyston Pipe &: Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 292 (6th Cir. 1898), 
afjd., 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
144. See Bork, supra note 36, at 393-94. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 
U.S. 1, 58 (1911). 
145. See generally Bork, supra note 36, at 391-97. 
146. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 356 n.3 (1967); Timken Roller Dear• 
ing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951). 
147. A territorial restriction could mean reduced selling costs, and thus lower 
prices. See Bork, supra note 36, at 398-405. 
148. C. KAYSEN &: D. TURNER, supra note 8, at 142. See also A. NEALE, supra note I, 
at 436-37. 
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outset actual or potential competitors, 149 the restriction eliminates 
little competition from a given geographic area. Indeed, it may often 
be the case that the restriction is part of a horizontal agreement 
that provides a procompetitive benefit, such as increased efficiency. 
In Topco's circumstances, smaller stores were given the opportunity 
to compete with the large national chains. Without the restrictions 
as an inducement, the stores would not have been able to form the 
cooperative with its attendant economies of scale. In this respect, the 
restriction was truly ancillary to an agreement furthering competi-
tion. And if at some later time the restriction did prevent some 
intraband competition,150 it restrained a competition that had be-
come possible only because the Topco arrangement itself had been 
so successful and had facilitated the expansion of the member stores 
into new market areas. Under a rule of reason analysis the restric-
tions in Topco should in fact be validated. 
C. Schwinn Revisted 
If the Court does use the rule of reason to test horizontal restric-
tions among noncompetitors, it would create some question whether 
vertical territorial restrictions should continue to be considered per 
se illegal, as was suggested in Schwinn.151 The same ·considerations 
that justify use of the rule of reason in cases of horizontal territorial 
restrictions among noncompetitors apply to vertical territorial re-
strictions. 
The reason for the rejection of the per se rule for horizontal 
restrictions among noncompetitors is that there is no clear indication 
that these restrictions would have an adverse effect on competition. 
Likewise, it is also unclear whether vertical territorial restrictions, 
in general, would tend to affect prices. When the product in ques-
tion is unique, so that territorial restrictions create a monopoly, 
perhaps there may be some justification for declaring the restrictions 
to be unlawful.152 In other more common situations, when there are 
149. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), in which the 
Court enumerated several criteria for trial courts to consider in determining whether 
two parties are potential competitors. The criteria included "[t]he number and power 
of the competitors in the relevant market; the background of their growth ••• the 
relationship of their lines of commerce .•• the setting in which the joint venture was 
created; the reasons and necessities for its existence ••• the potential power of the 
joint venture in the relevant market." 378 U.S. at 176-77. 
150. The trial court found that several stores expanded into other licensees' terri-
tories even though the new outlets were not allowed to carry Topco products. The 
court further noted that many licensees left Topco when they were large enough to 
develop their own private labels. 319 F. Supp. at 1042. 
151. See text accompanying note 86 supra. 
152. In these circumstances, a territorial restriction gives the retailer the opportunity 
to set a monopoly price and misallocate resources. However, if the manufacturer could 
have vertically integrated and sold his products at retail, he too would sell at the 
monopoly. price. Thus, the price at which retailers protected ,by territo!ial, restrictions 
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several substitute products, the effect of such restrictions is less 
certain. In fact, two different schools of economic thought have 
developed on this issue. On the one hand, Professor Comanor argues 
that vertical territorial restrictions lead to a serious misallocation of 
resources.153 The assumption behind Professor Comanor's argument 
is that the consumer should be the one to decide how many manu-
facturers should sell a particular product in a given area or how 
much service should be provided by the dealer;154 if services sup-
plied are less than that demanded, the price should rise until de-
mand equals supply. Likewise, if supply exceeds demand, prices 
should drop until supply reaches the new equilibrium level. Thus, 
Professor Comanor seems to suggest that by allowing consumers and 
not manufacturers to decide how much of a given product should be 
supplied to a given geographic market, the long-run effect should 
be a better allocation of resources. 
On the other side of this debate, Professor Bork argues that it 
should be the manufacturer who decides how his product should 
be distributed to consumers, for such a decision can be made 
without misallocating resources.155 It is his contention that vertical 
territorial restrictions are a source of efficiency in themselves.156 Ac-
cording to his theory, the manufacturer has the choice either to 
integrate vertically or set up an alternative system of distribution. 
If he chooses the latter method, then this is because it appears to 
the manufacturer to be the more efficient approach.167 There may 
also be cases when the manufacturer ivill not have the choice be-
tween distribution methods. In these instances, vertical territorial 
restrictions may allow him to attract distributors by offering them 
exclusive territories in exchange for the use of their capital for ex-
penditures, such as advertising, which the manufacturer himself 
might not be able to finance.158 Professor Bork concludes that there 
sell may not be higher than the price without the restrictions had the manufacturer 
integrated vertically. The use of vertical territorial restrictions would only mean that 
the monopoly profit might be divided between the retailers and the manufacturer. 
See Bork, supra note 36, at 402-03. 
153. See Comanor, supra note 29. 
154. Id. at 423-25. 
155. See Bork, supra note 36, at 397-405. 
156. See id. at 403. 
157. See id. at 403. Note that under Bork's theory, the consumer still has the 
final choice regarding resource allocation. If the distribution method chosen by a 
manufacturer is less efficient and thus more costly, the manufacturer will receive lower 
profits if he keeps his wholesale price constant. If he raises his wholesale price, he 
faces the possibility that retailers will refuse to carry his product unless they can pass 
on the price increase to customers. If this occurs, then total sales of the manufacturer's 
product will decrease because some consumers will not pay the higher price. Thus, 
the consumer's responsiveness to changes in price ensures that the manufacturer will 
want to choose the most efficient distribution system. Id. at 397-429. 
158, See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). Cf, Packard Motor 
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are numerous instances in which vertical territorial restric~ions are 
essential for the promotion of interband competition .. Accordingly, 
Professor Bork argues that vertical restrictions should be per se 
legal.150 
The Bork and Comanor theories reflect different views on the 
implementation of antitrust policy. The merits of both have been 
substantially debated.160 The extent of disagreement between the 
two schools should in itself be sufficient evidence that vertical 
territorial restrictions should not be per se illegal. If economists 
do not agree on the desirability of these restrictions, then the cer-
tainty to be obtained by use of the per se rule may be obtained. at 
great economic cost. It will be remembered that horizontal terri-
torial restrictions among competitors were prohibited because in 
every instance there would be some tendency to enhance prices and 
misallocate resources.161 For vertical territorial restrictions, it is 
doubtful whether such an adverse effect will always occur. On the 
contrary, there may be many instances in which such restrictions 
lower prices and produce a more efficient allocation of resources for 
consumers.162 This is particularly true when there is intense inter-
brand competition. In these instances, the absence of vertical re-
strictions would mean wasted sales effort among dealers carrying 
the same product.163 The disagreement among economists concern-
ing the effect of vertical restrictions on resource allocation would 
provide the Court with a sufficient justification for overruling 
Schwinn. However, there are two additional reasons why the Court 
should adopt this approach and overrule Schwinn. 
Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 355 
U.S. 822 (1957). 
159. Bork, supra note 36, at 475. 
160. See, e.g., Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question in the 
Sherman Act, 30 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 286 (1963); Note, supra note I. For a broader dis-
cussion of Professor Bork's attitude toward vertical restrictions and antitrust policy, 
see Blake &: Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 377 (1965); Blake 8: 
Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 422 (1965); 
Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 401 (1965); Bork &: Bowman, 
Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: II, 1i5 Coun-r. L. R.Ev. 417 (1965) . 
. 161. See text accompanying notes 144-45 supra. 
162. Cf. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957), in which the court held that an agree-
ment by an automobile manufacturer to limit his dealerships in a given area to one 
outlet was a reasonable restraint on trade. The outlet had been losing money and 
requested that the manufacturer give it an exclusive dealership. The only reason for 
the request, assuming there was no specific intent to drive a competitor out of business, 
was that it viewed an exclusive franchise as essential ,to achieve the economies of 
scale necessary to make a profit. Since it is doubtful that the outlet could have suc-
cessfuIIy raised prices because of tpe interbrand competition in the auto· industry, 
there seems to be a s1:1bstantial possibility that the economies would be passed on to 
the. consumer in the fQrm of Im-.:~ prices._ 
163. See generally Bork, supra note 36, at 430-52. 
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First; ·there were simply no legal precedents to support the con• 
tention that all vertical territorial restrictions in sales cases should 
be per se illegal. It was only in 1963 that the Court heard White 
Motor, the first case to question the legality of these restrictions. 
Even then, the Court refused to accept the Government's contention 
that they were so pernicious that they should be per se illegal. The 
Court decided to wait until it had the opportunity to learn more 
about the "business stuff" behind vertical territorial restrictions 
before reaching a conclusion concerning their legality.184 Four years 
later, when Schwinn came before the Court, the per se rule for ver-
tical territorial restrictions was announced even though the Court 
had heard no cases involving this type of restriction since White 
.Motor.165 The Court, in announcing the Schwinn rule, ignored its 
own advice and consequently promulgated a rule that is neither 
desirable under economic theory nor justified by legal precedent. 
The Court should reject the Schwinn rule, and at the least, wait 
until it has reviewed more vertical territorial restrictions before 
making a decision regarding the legality of these restraints. 
There is a further reason why the Court should reverse its pres-
ent position on vertical territorial restrictions. The primary justi-
fication for the Court's holding in Schwinn seems to be the ancient 
rule against restraints on alienation.166 The Court appears to have 
adopted this rationale because ·it had been used previously in Dr. 
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.161 to prohibit another 
vertical restriction, resale price maintenance. The Court's use of the 
restraint on alienation theory to justify a per se rule against 
such vertical price-fixing has been subject to criticism.168 Even if 
vertical price-fixing should be per se illegal, it does not fol-
low that vertical territorial restrictions should be subject to an in-
flexible per se rule. As commentators have noted, there may be 
significant differences between the two types of restrictions. In the 
case of resale price maintenance by a manufacturer, it appears that 
the restriction will affect competition because retailers carrying that 
product cannot competitively price against other retailers carrying 
164. See text accompanying note 23 supra. 
165. The only. other major cases involving vertical territorial restrictions, Snap-On 
'fools and Sandura, were not appealed to the Supreme Court. 
166. See 388 U.S. at 377-78. The -Government argued that both the customer and 
territorial restrictions were restraints upon alienation. The Court responded to this 
contention by stating simply, "We agree." 388 U.S. at 378. 
167. 220 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1911). 
168. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &: Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382, 391-92 (1967) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Bork, supra note 36, at 398; Elman, "Petrified 
Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 625, 629 (1966); Jordan, Ex• 
elusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws, 9 UCLA L. REv. 111, 
153-54 (1962); Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 
45 CORNELL L Q. 254, 265-66 (1960);,-Ncite, supta note 1, at 800. 
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the same product. Nor can a retailer compete effectively with mer-
chants carrying similar products. Resale price maintenance places 
a limitation on a retailer's ability to carry on his business; it pre-
vents intrabrand competition, and takes from the retailer a sub-
stantial degree of his ability to meet interbrand competition.169 
On the other hand, his ability to meet competition when he is 
subject to a territorial restriction is significantly greater than when 
the restriction concerns resale price maintenance. Under a territorial 
restriction, a retailer can still set his price, so the restriction need 
not hinder interbrand competition.170 Moreover intrabrand compe-
tition would still be possible, though perhaps unlikely. A particular 
retailer could set his price so low that he would attract customers 
from other territories. Vertical territorial restrictions have a much 
less severe effect on both interbrand and intrabrand competition, 
as well as the retailer's independence of decision-making. It is ques-
tionable whether the restraints-on-alienation rule, a doubtful ratio-
nale for the per se rule against price maintenance, should be carried 
over to vertical territorial restrictions. 
As Justice Stewart noted in the Schwinn dissent, it would be 
better to look at the economics behind the problem than to rely 
on a holdover from the common law, a rule formulated under sub-
stantially different circumstances.171 Since economic theory has 
shown that vertical territorial restrictions do not necessarily have any 
adverse effects on resource allocation or competition and since legal 
precedents suggest that the Schwinn rule is unfounded, it would 
seem appropriate for the Court to overrule Schwinn and replace 
the per se rule with the rule of reason. 
V. CONCLUSION 
T opco provides the Court with an occasion to dispel much of the 
confusion left in the wake of Sealy and Schwinn. The Court should 
take this opportunity to clarify the bounds of the per se rule against 
horizontal territorial restrictions. As T opco convincingly illustrates, 
there are cases in which horizontal territorial restrictions among 
former noncompetitors will have little adverse effect on intrabrand 
competition, yet will significantly contribute to interbrand competi-
tion. An examination of precedents in which horizontal arrangements 
were declared to be unlawful shows that it is only when the agree-
ments are among competitors that the Court has applied the per se 
169. But see Bork, supra note 36, at 404-05. 
170. Cf. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). 
171. 388 U.S. at 391-93. See also Elman, supra note 168, at 629-34, who suggests 
that the applicability of this doctrine to modern commerce, where the manufacturer 
may have an interest in his property after it is sold, is not only questionable, but 
wrong. 
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rule. Thus, Topco should be used by the Court to limit application 
of the per se rule to agreements among actual or potential competi-
tors. 
In addition to reconsidering the horizontal per se rule, the Court 
should also use Topco to reject the Schwinn doctrine. The rationale 
for a per se proscription in Schwinn seems to be based solely upon 
the outdated rule against restraints on alienation and an economic 
philosophy that is subject to substantial criticism. Although Topco 
itself may not be a vertical case, it nevertheless provides an oppor-
tunity for the Court to announce a unified doctrine for all terri-
torial restrictions. Since vertical restrictions are perhaps justifiable 
in that they may have no effect on competition, and since there is 
no developed case law on these restrictions, the Court should hold 
that vertical territorial restrictions, as well as horizontal territorial 
restrictions among noncompetitors, are to be evaluated under the 
rule of reason. 
